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Abstract
The paper builds Distributional National Accounts (DINA) using household survey data. We
present a transparent and reproducible methodology to construct DINA whenever administrative tax
data are not available for research and apply it to various European countries. By doing so, we build
synthetic microdata les which cover the entire distribution, include all income components individually
aligned to national accounts, and preserve the detailed socioeconomic information available in the
surveys. The methodology uses harmonized and publicly available data sources (SILC, HFCS) and
provides highly comparable results. We discuss the methodological steps and their impact on the
income distribution. In particular, we highlight the eects of imputations and the adjustment of the
variables to national accounts totals. Furthermore, we compare dierent income concepts of both the
DINA and EG-DNA approach of the OECD in a consistent way. Our results conrm that constructing
DINA is crucial to get a better picture of the income distribution. Our methodology is well suited to
build synthetic microdata les which can be used for policy evaluation like social impact analysis and
microsimulation.
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1 Introduction
More than two decades have passed since Anthony B. Atkinson reminded the economics profession of the
importance of "bringing income distribution in from the cold" (Atkinson, 1997). Since then, matters of
income and wealth distribution and their determinants have enormously gained in importance in the eld
of economics and the public debate. A recent milestone in this line of research is the work on Distributional
National Accounts (DINA), which aim at reconciling micro- and macroeconomic data. The need to build
DINA arises from the fact that, on the one hand, national accounts are limited in their representation
of the socio-economic heterogeneity of households and individuals within an economy. Survey and tax
data, on the other hand, oer information on distributions in great detail but are often inconsistent with
macroeconomic variables. The main contribution of DINA is to allow for a distributional analysis of core
macroeconomic concepts (i.e., national income or GDP) along the entire spectrum of the population.
So far, this endeavour has been pursued by two almost separate initiatives. On the one hand, a group
of prominent scholars such as Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman (see Piketty, Saez,
& Zucman, 2018) collect their work under the umbrella of the World Wealth and Income Database
(WID). On the other hand, national statistical agencies cooperate closely with the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in compiling distributional measures of household
income, consumption and saving within the framework of the national accounts. While both aim to
align distributional statistics to the economic aggregates, they dier in scope, concepts and methodology.
Against this backdrop, it is crucial to analyse how these dierences shape our understanding of the
developments of inequality.
Even more importantly, both approaches have dierent goals. WID focuses on historical time series
in order to track the long-run developments of inequality. They emphasise the role of the top tail for
distributional statistics and therefore heavily rely on tax data and Pareto imputation techniques. While
this has become the de facto standard procedure to derive inequality indicators for total income, it usually
comes at the cost of losing information on separate income components and their relation to socioeconomic
characteristics at the individual and household level. EG-DNA builds its analysis on sample surveys that
are collected and maintained within the national statistical oces. Based on their longtime experience
with both survey data and national accounts, their goal is to fuse their expertise in both branches to
enhance their standard reporting on the development of living conditions. As a result, they are planning
to publish updated inequality indicators and information on income, consumption and saving at the
quintile level.
Obviously, both approaches have their virtues and are well suited to answer specic research questions.
Unfortunately, from the perspective of this paper, they also share a common weakness. They lack either
the granularity of income components or the information on the joint distribution of income with policy-
relevant socioeconomic characteristics at the household level, which is necessary to conduct thorough
social impact analysis. Such analysis has become a vital tool to inform policymakers about the various
consequences of reform proposals and support their decision-making process.
This paper builds on the insights of both the DINA and the EG-DNA initiative. We propose a transpar-
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ent and reproducible methodology, which uses only harmonised and publicly available data sources. It
facilitates comparable cross-country analysis and can be applied whenever tax data are not available for
research. As a result, we provide enhanced micro datasets that cover the entire distribution, include all
income components separately aligned to national accounts, and preserve the detailed socioeconomic in-
formation available in the surveys. Furthermore, we compare the methodological choices and assumptions
of the DINA and the EG-DNA approach and analyse their impact on the measured income distribution.
In particular, we highlight the eects of imputations and the adjustment of the variables to national
accounts totals. Moreover, we apply the methodology to calculate distributions for various income def-
initions of both the DINA and EG-DNA approach in a consistent way. Thus, using the same unit of
analysis and the same target population, we can directly compare the results of these two, so far entirely
separated, approaches.
Distributional National Accounts form the most recent endeavour in compiling data on the distribution
of income and wealth. The origins of this line of work go back to Kuznets (1955), who was not only
one of the rst scholars compiling inequality statistics but was also very prominent in the process of
developing the system of national accounts. Only several decades later, Atkinson (1971), Piketty (2003)
and Piketty and Saez (2003) undertook comparable exercises and compiled time series of top income and
wealth shares for the United Kingdom, France and the United States. These contributions breathed new
life into inequality research and brought the topic back centre stage in economics (Piketty, 2015). They,
however, came under some criticism for focussing only at the top of the distribution and not representing
the developments in the bottom- and middle-income segments of the population. Around the same time
and from a somewhat dierent angle, the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance
and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009) concluded that aggregate measures such as GDP
do not adequately picture the progress of well-being. As these statistics conceal dierential outcomes for
dierent groups of the population, more prominence should be given to the distribution of macroeconomic
variables. These distributions, however, are traditionally not included in national accounts. Survey and
tax data, which provide information on distributions are, on the other hand, usually not consistent with
national accounts.
DINA can be interpreted as an attempt to address these shortcomings. In contrast to previous research,
the DINA initiative aims at providing statistics on the entire distribution that are consistent with the
macroeconomic aggregates. Since the guidelines on the general methodology (Alvaredo et al., 2016) were
published, DINA have been compiled for various countries (e.g. Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, &
Zucman, 2017; Blanchet, Chancel, & Gethin, 2019; Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, & Piketty, 2018; Piketty et
al., 2018; Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2019). Most of these datasets are built from administrative tax data,
on which the DINA methodology relies as its primary source of distributional information. However, in a
variety of countries tax data are not available to researchers, at least not at the necessary level of detail,
which makes it even more dicult to apply the core DINA methodology. Even if tax data are available,
the denition of taxable income and their coverage in ocial statistics dier in countries because of the
tax law, so that an idiosyncratic approach is necessary for each country to construct DINA. Furthermore,
access to data often hinges on special arrangements with local authorities that impede comparable cross-
country analysis with administrative data.
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The other prominent approach compiling distributional results in line with national accounts goes back
to the OECD, Eurostat and national statistical institutes from various EU countries, which formed the
Expert Group on Disparities in National Accounts (EG-DNA) in 2011. The EG-DNA has so far issued
several reports on the progress of developing a standard methodology for building distributional measures
for household income, consumption and saving that are consistent with national accounts (Fesseau &
Mattonetti, 2013; Fesseau, Wol, & Mattonetti, 2013; Zwijnenburg, Bournot, & Giovannelli, 2017). The
approach primarily works with survey data and aims to arrive at breakdowns of the household sector
at a quite aggregated level (usually quintiles). It diers from the DINA approach in that it focuses
on households instead of individual adults as their unit of analysis and uses dierent income concepts,
which do not include parts of national income outside the household sector, such as retained earnings or
collective consumption (see section 2). A variety of countries, such as Australia, have already published
distributional results following the guidelines of the EG-DNA (Seneviratne, 2016). As of today, the expert
group is planning to release its nal report with methodical guidelines any time soon.
The paper contributes to both strands of the literature in three ways: First, we build DINA datasets
from survey data, using harmonized and publicly available sources of information (SILC, HFCS) and
applying a simple and reproducible methodology. This "one-method-ts-all" approach can be applied
to all European countries for which these sources are available without relying on any idiosyncratic
knowledge about tax and social security systems. Furthermore, the uniform approach makes the results
highly comparable across countries. Second, our results consist of synthetic microdata les, which cover
the entire distribution, include all income components separately at a granular level, and are consistent
with national accounts. Such data les are in principle usable for the impact analysis of policy measures,
such as a tax or social security reform. Third, we compare the DINA and EG-DNA approach, using the
same target population and unit of analysis. By doing so, we can analyze the implications of the use of
dierent income concepts for the distribution, controlling for other sources of dierences in outcomes.
We nd that realigning the dierent income ows to national account totals and including the income of
other sectors increase inequality in most countries. This generally conrms the need to construct DINA
to get an adequate picture of the income distribution. Furthermore, the impact of a specic variable on
inequality depends (1) on its distribution in the original dataset, (2) how well it is covered in the surveys
(compared to national account totals), and (3) its contribution to national income. All three factors vary
substantially between countries and data sources. Our methodology is in general very useful to build
synthetic datasets which are better suited for policy analyses than the original survey data. It should,
however, be applied with some caution when building a longer-term time series of inequality.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a detailed description of our methodology and
compares it with those of the two approaches mentioned above. In particular, it discusses the matching
between household surveys and national accounts as well as the imputations of variables that are not
included in the microdata. Section 3 discusses the results for the distribution of income both for the
household sector and for national aggregates. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Methodology
2.1 Data and income concepts
The aim of the paper is to build Distributional National Accounts from household surveys. We generally
follow the methodology of Piketty et al. (2018) but use the insights of the EG-DNA initiative to reconcile
survey data with national accounts. Since we take a "one-method-ts-all" approach for European coun-
tries, we only use information which is provided by common sources. To check for the robustness of our
results and the sensitivity of the methodology, we build DINA based on two dierent data sources: the
European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC), provided by Eurostat, and the Household
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) of the European Central Bank, both of which are extensively
used for distributional analyses in the literature.
The SILC provides yearly data and includes several types of incomes as well as socio-economic data for
around 230,000 households and 570,000 individuals in 29 European countries. The most recently published
wave of the HFCS was conducted in 2014, including more than 84,000 households and 210,000 individuals
in 20 countries. Detailed descriptions of both datasets and their methodology are provided by Eurostat
(2019) and the Household Finance and Consumption Network (2016).
To re-align survey data to national accounts' totals, we use annual data for non-nancial sectoral accounts,
provided by Eurostat. The data include incomes and expenditures for institutional sectors such as private
households, non-nancial and nancial corporations, and the government. They are harmonized across
countries and are commonly used as key indicators for economic development and well-being. A detailed
description of the data is found in Eurostat (2013).
Following Piketty et al. (2018), we use national income as our key income concept. National income
includes all institutional sectors of the economy, not only private households, which are the primary focus
of surveys. The basic idea of using national income in DINA is that all income ultimately accrues to
households and individuals in one form or another.
The DINA literature focuses on four dierent denitions of national income. Pre-tax factor income
(PRTFI) is the primary income of all domestic sectors of the economy, net of depreciation and including
net income ows with other countries. Pre-tax national income (PRTNI) corrects pre-tax factor income
for eects of the social securtiy system by adding benets and substracting contributions. For the latter,
the DINA guidelines propose two alternative denitions: First, taking into account the redistributive of
the pension system only, and second, considering the eects of the entire social security system. We
choose the second approach because pension and other social contributions cannot be separated due to
limitations in the Eurostat data.1 Since beneciaries and contributors are usually dierent households and
individuals, and the money ows do not add up, we furthermore include the balance between these two
items in order to make pre-tax national income equal to pre-tax factor income. Pre-tax national income is
1Due to the limitaions in the data, we deviate from the DINA guidelines in that we include all monetary transfers (D62)
instead of pension and other social benets (D621+D622). The dierence are social assistence benets in kind (D623), which
cannot be separated in the data. Furthermore, we do not include private pensions (D442), which are not available from the
Eurostat database.
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useful to compare income in countries with notable dierences in their pension systems. Private pension
plans are already a part of pre-tax factor income, so that countries with substantial private pensions
usually exhibit a signicantly lower inequality of pre-tax factor income than those which rely more on the
public pension system. Pre-tax national income is considered as the primary variable for income before
taxes by the DINA literature.
Post-tax disposable income (POTDI) deducts all direct and indirect taxes from pre-tax national income.
It is thus substantially smaller in value than the other three income concepts. The size of the public sector
diers between countries, so that post-tax disposable income is challenging to compare. Nevertheless, it
conceptually comes closest to household disposable income. The DINA literature, however, focuses more
on post-tax national income (POTNI), which is obtained by adding social transfers in kind and collective
consumption. Post-tax national income is the key indicator used to describe the distribution once we
account for the eects of the public sector.
In addition to the abovementioned DINA income concepts, we use two more income concepts from the
EG-DNA initiative: household disposable income (DINC) and adjusted household disposable income
(ADINC). Both account only for the household sector and leave the other sectors aside. Disposable
income includes all forms of employment and self-employment income as well as imputed rents, capital
income and social transfers, net of taxes and contributions. Adjusted disposable income furthermore
includes social transfers in kind. By calculating these two additional types of income, we can compare
the results of the DINA methodology to those of the EG-DNA approach. Table 1 provides an overview of
the income concepts, its calculation from national accounts, and the corresponding variables in the HFCS
and SILC datasets (see also the following subsection).
2.2 Matching survey data with national accounts
All income concepts are calculated at the micro-level. Following Piketty et al. (2018), our unit of analysis
is the individual adult, aged 20 years or above. We thus exclude children and teenagers, as well as
people in institutions.2 Furthermore, we construct DINA based on two dierent ways of income splitting,
the 'equal' and 'individual split' (Piketty et al., 2018). The rst approach divides the pooled household
income equally between individuals, thus eliminating inequalities within households. While this concept is
similar in idea to the household concept used by the EG-DNA initiative, there are signicant dierences:
In contrast to the latter, the equal split weighs all adult individuals equally and assumes away any
economies of scale of living in a shared household. The individual split, in contrast, attributes personal
income to individuals and divides income which is only available in the data at the household level, such
as capital income, equally between persons. The individual split generally yields higher inequality across
individuals than the equal split.
Our methodology comprises two major steps. First, we assign to each income component in the micro
dataset a corresponding variable from the national accounts. Since most types of income are dened
dierently in micro and macro data, the assignment is in some cases only the closest possible approx-
2The share of income of these persons is small in European countries. See Zwijnenburg (2019) for a detailed discussion.
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Table 1 Income concepts
National Accounts HFCS SILC
1) EG-DNA
Gross wages and salaries D11 PG0110 PY010G + PY020G + HY110G
Employer social contributions + D12 EUROMOD EUROMOD
Gross operating surplus & rents
received
+ B2G + D45 HG0310 + IMP HY040G + HY030G
Consumption of xed capital   P51C [part] IMP [B2G] IMP [B2G]
Gross mixed income + B3G PG0210 PY050G + HY170G
Consumption of xed capital   P51C [part] IMP [B3G] IMP [B3G]
Interest w/o FISIM & distributed
income of corporations
+ D41G + D42 HG0410 + HG0510 HY090G
FISIM for interest received + D41G { D41 IMP [D41G + D42] IMP [D41G + D42]
Other property income received + D43 + D44 IMP [D41G + D42] IMP [D41G + D42]
Interest paid   D41G DI1412 HY100G
FISIM for interest paid + D41 { D41G IMP [D41G] IMP [D41G]
Other property income paid   D4 (exc. D41G) neutral neutral
Primary income (net) = PRINC (B5N)
Current taxes on income: em-
ployment income
  D51 [part] EUROMOD EUROMOD
Current taxes on income: simu-
lated property income
  D51 [part] EUROMOD EUROMOD
Current taxes on income: non-
simulated property income
  D51 [part] IMP [D51] IMP [D51]
Current taxes on wealth   D59 IMP [D51] IMP [D51]
Employee social contributions   D61 { D12 EUROMOD EUROMOD
Monetary transfers + D62 PG0310 + PG0510 + HG0110 PY100G + PY110G + PY090G
+ PY120G + PY130G +
PY140G + HY050G + HY060G
+ HY070G
Other current transfers net + D7R { D7P neutral neutral
Disposable income (net) = DIINC (B6N)
Social transfers in kind + D63 equal equal
Adjusted disposable income = ADINC (B7N)
2) DINA
Primary income S14S15 B5N (S14S15)
Primary income S11 + B5N (S11) IMP [D41G + D42] IMP [D41G + D42]
Primary income S12 + B5N (S12) IMP [D41G + D42] IMP [D41G + D42]
Net operating surplus & mixed
income S13
+ B2A3N (S13) IMP [D41G + D42] IMP [D41G + D42]
Net property income S13 + D4 (S13) IMP [D41G + D42] IMP [D41G + D42]
Net indirect taxes + D2 { D3 (S13) neutral neutral
Pre-tax factor income = PRTFI
Social contributions   D61 (S14S15) EUROMOD EUROMOD
Monetary transfers + D62 (S14S15) PG0310 + PG0510 + HG0110 PY100G + PY110G + PY090G
+ PY120G + PY130G +
PY140G + HY050G + HY060G
+ HY070G
Dierence D61 & D62 + D61 { D62 (S14S15) neutral neutral
Pre-tax national income = PRTNI
Net indirect taxes   D2 { D3 (S13) neutral neutral
Current taxes on income and
wealth S14S15
  D51 + D59 (S14S15) EUROMOD + IMP EUROMOD + IMP
Current taxes on income and
wealth (other sectors)
  D51 + D59 (other) IMP [D51 + D59 (S14S15)] IMP [D51 + D59 (S14S15)]
Post-tax disposable income = POTDI
Social transfers in kind + D63 (S14S15) equal equal
Collective consumption + P32 (S13) equal equal
Primary surplus S13 + D2 { D3 + D51 + D59
{ D63 { P32 (S13)
neutral neutral
Post-tax national income = POTNI
Notes: This table shows the composition of income concepts, their variable codes in the raw data or if the data had to be imputed.
Source: SNA, HFCS, SILC.
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imation. Our two sources, SILC and HFCS, usually have dierent variable denitions, so that neither
of the two datasets is ideal to be aligned to national accounts. This methodical step corresponds to the
DINA methodology with the dierence that we use incomes from survey data and not tax data. Since
the income denitions in tax data also deviate from national accounts, the abovementioned methodical
imprecision is inherent in the DINA methodology.
Table 2 provides a summary of the correspondence of macro and micro data of private households. Gross
wages and salaries in the national accounts (D11) include cash and non-cash employee income. The latter
is only available in SILC data, where employee income is split in cash or near-cash income (PY010G)
and non-cash employee income (PY020G). As a third component, gross income of people younger than
16 years (HY110G) is provided at the household level and is split between the individual adults. For the
HFCS, gross cash employee income (PG0110) is the only variable assigned to the corresponding macro
variable.
Gross operating surplus (B2G) in the national accounts includes own-account production of accommoda-
tion services by owner-occupier households (imputed rents) as well as income from rent. These correspond
to the variables HY030G and HY040G in SILC. The HFCS only includes income from real estate property
(HG0310). We thus calculate imputed rents following a capital market approach (see next subsection).
Furthermore, both SILC and HFCS cover rents from land. We thus add the variable D45G from national
accounts.
Gross mixed income (B3G) represents the surplus or decit of unincorporated enterprises recorded in the
household sector. The variable also includes the surplus from underground and own-account production.
The corresponding variables of SILC are gross cash benets or losses from self-employment (PY050G), and
the gross value of goods produced for own consumption (HY170G). The HFCS does not cover the value
of own consumption, its corresponding variable is thus only the gross self-employment income (PG0210).
Furthermore, both surveys do not cover underground activities, which is one of the reasons for a low
coverage rate for this income source (see section 3).
For capital income, only received interest not adjusted for FISIM (D41G, received) and distributed income
of corporations (D42) have corresponding variables in the micro datasets. SILC provides a summary
variable for gross interests, dividends, and prots from capital investment in unincorporated businesses
(HY0900G), whereas in the HFCS capital income is divided into gross income from nancial investments
(HG0410) and gross income from a private business other than self-employment (HG0510). Interest
payments in national accounts (D41G, paid) are assigned interest payments for outstanding loans from
the HFCS (DI1412) and gross interest payments on mortgages in the SILC (HY100G). Both variables
only partly correspond to the national account's denition.
For social benets (D62), national account data are split into pensions, unemployment benets, and other
social transfers, each of which has corresponding variables in the HFCS (PG0310, PG0510, HG0110).
For the SILC, we aggregate old-age benets (PY100G) and survivor benets (PY110G) for pensions
and assign all other social benets except unemployment benets (PY090G) to other social transfers in
national accounts data.
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Table 2 Matching macro and micro variables
National Accounts HFCS SILC
Gross wages and salaries D11 Gross cash employee income PG0110 Gross cash or near cash em-
ployee income
PY010G
Gross non-cash employee in-
come
PY020G
Gross income received by
people aged under 16
HY110G
Gross operating surplus B2G Gross rental income from real
estate property
HG0310 Gross income from rental of a
property or land
HY040G
Imputed rents B2G Gross imputed rent HY030G
Rents (rec.) D45
Gross mixed income B3G Gross self-employment in-
come (prot/losses of unin-
corporated enterprises)
PG0210 Gross cash benets or losses
from self-employment
PY050G
Gross value of goods pro-
duced for own-consumption
HY170G
Interest (rec., w/o FISIM) D41G Gross income from nancial
investments
HG0410 Gross interests, dividends,
prot from capital invest-
ment in uncorporated busi-
ness
HY090G
Distributed income of corpora-
tions
D42 Gross income from private
business other than self-
employment
HG0510
Interest (paid, w/o FISIM) D41G Interest payments DI1412 Gross interest repayments on
mortgage
HY100G
Social benets other than social
transfers in kind (pensions)
D62 Gross income from public
pensions
PG0310 Gross old-age benets PY100G
Gross survivor benets PY110G
Social benets other than so-
cial transfers in kind (unemploy-
ment)
D62 Gross income from unem-
ployment benets
PG0510 Gross unemployment benets PY090G
Social benets other than social
transfers in kind (other)
D62 Gross income from regular
social transfers
HG0110 Gross sickness benets PY120G
Gross disability benets PY130G
Gross education-related al-
lowances
PY140G
Gross family/children-related
allowances
HY050G
Gross social exclusion not
elsewhere classied
HY060G
Gross housing allowances HY070G
Notes: This table shows the detailled correspondence of macro and micro data for private households.
Source: SNA, HFCS, SILC.
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2.3 Imputation of additional variables
The second major step of our methodology is to impute from other sources those variables from national
accounts that have no direct correspondence in the survey data (Table 1). We generally follow the
guidelines of the DINA methodology (Piketty et al., 2018) but use only information from common sources
for all countries for the imputations.
The rst and foremost part of imputations concerns taxes and social contributions. Both are usually not
separately available in survey data.3 We thus use EUROMOD, a widely available tax-benet microsim-
ulation model for the EU to calculate tax and contribution rates along the income distribution for each
country. In a rst step, we separate direct taxes in national account data (D51) between employment and
capital taxes, using data on taxation by the European Commission (2016).4 Taxes on employment income
and capital income are then simulated with EUROMOD at the individual level and are aggregated to
average tax rates on these two income sources for each percentile of the income distribution. Finally, they
are levied on all individuals within that income segment. A part of capital taxes is not simulated but
directly imputed according to the distribution of the simulated part. Furthermore, we impute taxes on
wealth (D59) similar to the sum of income taxes (D51). Social contributions are separated into employer
(D12) and employee contributions. Both are simulated at the micro level using EUROMOD.
The second part of imputations concerns imputed rents, which are included in SILC but are not covered
by the HFCS. To do so, we follow the capital market approach (Balcazar, Ceriani, Olivieri, & Ranzani,
2014). The HFCS provides information on the current value of an owned dwelling5 and of outstanding
mortgages, from which the net value of the residence is derived. The value is then multiplied by an
exogenous rate to calculate the imputed rent.6 For the SILC, we deduct interest paid on mortgages from
gross imputed rents to derive their net value.
Further imputations for other items of primary income of the household sector include consumption of
xed capital as well as FISIM and other property income (D43 and D44). The rst is split between gross
operating surplus and gross mixed income according to their relative macroeconomic proportions and
distributed to individuals in the same way as these two variables. The FISIM and other capital income
are imputed according to the distribution of interest income and distributed income of corporations (D41
and D42). The FISIM for paid taxes is distributed accordingly. Finally, other capital income paid is
distributed neutrally (Table 1).
Moving from the primary income of the household sector to pre-tax factor income, we impute the primary
income of the other sectors, which are not included in survey data. Since the primary income of non-
nancial and nancial corporations mostly consist of retained earnings, whose beneciaries are the owners
of these corporations, we generally assume that they are distributed like capital income. We proceed in
3The SILC provides both gross and net incomes, however without accounting for dierent taxes and social contributions
separately. The HFCS does not even include any information on net incomes.
4See Table A.3 in Appendix A.
5For free users, i.e. people who do neither own the residence nor pay rent, the value of the dwelling is not provided by
the HFCS. We derive it from the square meter price for similar types of dwelling in the group of homeowners.
6Following the literature (e.g. Fessler, Rehm, & Tockner, 2016), we chose a value of 3% for the exogenous rate, which
approximately represents the average interest rate of a risk-free asset such as a 10-year treasury bond.
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the same way with the operating surplus and the property income of the state. Net indirect taxes (D2
minus D3) are distributed neutrally since they are related to production and not income. Two other
sizable and important items are social transfers in kind and collective consumption, both of which we add
to calculate post-tax national income. Following Zwijnenburg et al. (2017) we distribute both variables
equally between individuals.
3 Results
3.1 Distributions for DINA and EG-DNA income concepts
We adopt the methodology of the previous section to construct Distributional National Accounts for
twelve European countries. Since we work with two dierent surveys (SILC and HFCS) for two specic
years (2010 and 2014) and use two dierent ways to split the household income (equal and individual
split, see section 2), we build eight synthetic micro datasets per country. Each DINA dataset consists
of adult individuals that represent the whole population. We account for dierent income components
separately so that we can calculate their specic impact on the distribution. With such a dataset, it is
generally possible to analyze the distributional eects of specic policy measures, such as a tax reform.
Figure 1 and 2 summarize the distribution of the dierent income concepts for all twelve countries.7 Both
surveys generally yield similar results, especially for the patterns of inequality in the income concepts.8
We start with the primary income of the household sector (PRINCO), which includes mostly variables
which are directly covered in the surveys (see Table 1). Primary income is in general, highly unequally
distributed in all countries, with a Gini coecient between 40 and 55. It includes self-employment and
capital income, both of which are usually concentrated on the top of the distribution. The top 5% share
of the primary income of the household sector ranges from 15 to 25%.
Rescaling the primary income to national accounts data (PRINC) generally increases the Gini coecient
in most of the countries by up to ve points. In some cases, however, inequality remains unchanged or
even decreases slightly. This is surprising because self-employment and capital income are usually not
very well covered in survey data and have thus signicant rescaling factors. One reason is that the Gini
coecient generally does not map the inequalities at the top and the bottom well. The top 5% share,
which is more appropriate for this purpose, increases considerably in almost all countries due to the
realignment of primary income to national accounts.
Even for this variable, however, there are some dierences in these patterns with regard to the data
source. In Belgium, the top 5% share does not increase for HFCS data. In Slovenia, the increase due to
the realignment is rather small for SILC data. These dierences can primarily be attributed to variations
7Throughout this section, we present the results for 2014. Following Piketty et al. (2018), our standard concept is the
equal split. Results for 2010 and the individual split can be found in Appendix B and C.
8In contrast to the patterns in the income concepts, the level of inequality diers considerably between SILC and HFCS
in some countries. This is generally due to variations in the coverage rate and the distribution of gross mixed income and/or
capital income between these two datasets. See discussion further below.
10
Figure 1 Inequality for income concepts: Gini coecient (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2014, Equal split)
Italy Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain
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Figure 2 Inequality for income concepts: Top 5% share (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2014, Equal split)
Italy Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain
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DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Income Concept
In
co
m
e 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 T
o
p 
5
Approach EG−DNA DINA Data Source HFCS SILC
Notes: This graph shows the income share of the Top 5% for dierent DINA income concepts by country.
Source: SNA, SILC, HFCS, own calculations and illustration.
11
in the coverage ratio or the inequality for gross mixed income and/or capital income.9 Particularly
interesting is the case of France, for which we nd no substantial increase in inequality both for HFCS
and SILC data. Capital income is very well covered there in both data sets so that realigning it to national
accounts does not aect whatsoever on inequality.
The next step, from primary income to pre-tax factor income (PRTFI), usually leads to a small increase
in inequality, albeit not in all countries. This eect stems from the inclusion of the primary income
of non-nancial and nancial rms as well as the state. The increase in the top 5% share is usually
considerably higher, which conrms once again that the latter maps the inequality at the top better than
the former. We nd similar peculiarities as for the previous methodological step, which is not surprising
because we distribute the primary income of these sectors similarly to capital income. Indeed, the top 5%
share only rises slightly in France. Likewise, we nd that in Belgium, the increase for the HFCS data is
much smaller than for SILC, and vice versa in Slovenia. Furthermore, there is an unusually large variation
in the increase of the top 5% share between the two data sources in Slovakia. The reason is that capital
income (and consequently also the primary income of the corporate sector in our methodology) is more
concentrated at the top in the HFCS data.
Interestingly, dierences in national accounts also play a role in these particularities. For example, the
ratio of the primary income of non-nancial and nancial rms to national income is rather low for France,
which contributes to the above-mentioned small increase in inequality. Similarly, this eect is almost nil in
Italy, because the primary income of this sector is minuscule compared to national income.10 In contrast,
the increase in inequality from PRINC to PRTFI is high in the Netherlands due to the substantial
contribution of the primary income of corporations to national income. Likewise, the dierences as
mentioned earlier in the increase in the top 5% share between the two data sources in Slovakia is enlarged
because of a similar circumstance.
The decline in inequality from pre-tax factor income to pre-tax national income (PRTNI) is generally very
large in all countries. This reects the redistributive impact of the welfare state, i.e. social contributions
and monetary transfers, including pensions. The movement to post-tax disposable income (POTDI) in
contrast results in a much smaller decline in inequality. This decline reects the eects of the tax system
(i.e. income and wealth taxes) and is consistent with the fact that the tax system is not very progressive
in many countries. Finally, going from post-tax disposable income to post-tax national income (POTNI)
again entails a large decrease in inequality in all countries, which is due to the inclusion of social transfers
in kind and collective consumption. We distribute both income components equally over the population,
which obviously reduces inequality. This eect is generally strong and as large as the eect of the welfare
system in many countries.
To summarize, rescaling household income and imputing income from other sectors increases inequality
in most countries. There are considerable dierences with respect to the data source. These dierences
9The coverage ratio for gross mixed income in Belgium is higher for the HFCS than for the SILC. In Slovenia, the top
5% share in gross mixed income is higher for the HFCS. Similar dierences can be found for capital income. Such variations
are partly also responsible for the dierences in outcomes between the two inequality measures. See below for a detailed
discussion.
10Variations in national accounts are thus another source contributing to the patterns in inequality, which is a characteristic
inherent in the DINA methodology. See Table A.2 in Appendix A for a summary of the variables in national account data.
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primarily result from the coverage rate and/or distribution of mixed income and capital income, as well
as the importance of these variables and the primary income of the corporate sector in national accounts.
The increase in inequality due to the rst two methodological steps is, however, much smaller than its
decrease because of the redistribution by the state. All three steps in the redistribution process, i.e. from
pre-tax factor income to pre-tax national income and then to post-tax disposable and national income,
contribute signicantly to this reduction in inequality. This decline reects the redistributive eects of the
welfare state, the tax system, collective consumption and social transfers in kind. The highest decreases
in inequality are due to the rst and the last two, whereas the tax system is usually not very progressive
in most countries. This generally reproduces the ndings of Piketty et al. (2018) and other contributions
to the World Income Database.
In general, the results are highly similar for both years for which we construct DINA.11 There are minor
variations as to the coverage rates and distributions of the variables, in particular of mixed income
and capital income, so that the patterns of inequality between income concepts change slightly. The
distributions of the individual split are more unequal for all income concepts, countries, and years, given
the fact that for this methodical approach, personal income remains attributed to individuals (see section
2 and Piketty et al., 2018).
Finally, we calculate the disposable income and adjusted disposable income of the household sector in
order to compare the DINA income concepts with those of the EG-DNA approach. Moving from primary
income (PRINC) to disposable income (DINC), inequality declines substantially. This step includes the
deduction of taxes and contributions from income as well as the addition of monetary transfers. It thus
reects the eect of the state on the income distribution of the household sector. Interestingly, the impact
of rescaling of the variables on the distribution of disposable income (i.e., moving from DINCO to DINC) is
larger than on that of primary income (from PRINCO to PRINC). This is primarily due to a considerable
upscaling of taxes and monetary transfers, variables which are not considered in primary income. The
dierence between unscaled primary and disposable income (PRINCO vs. DINCO) is therefore also larger
than between rescaled incomes (PRINC vs. DINC). Furthermore, the distributions of disposable income
of the household sector and post-tax disposable income show considerable dierences in most countries.
This is due to the inclusion of the primary income of the corporate sector and the state.
Adjusting disposable income for social transfers in kind (ADINC) expectedly decreases inequality, since
we distribute the latter equally across individuals. Interestingly, the Gini coecient of adjusted disposable
income is similar to post-tax national income in many countries. Apparently, the distributive eect of the
primary income of the other sectors and that of collective consumption, which are the main dierences
between these two income concepts, partly neutralize each other. The step from disposable (DINC)
to adjusted disposable income (ADINC) is nevertheless smaller than the one from post-tax disposable
(POTDI) to post-tax national income (POTNI), because the latter also includes collective consumption.
11Results for 2010 as well as for the individual split are reported in Appendix B and C.
13
3.2 Contributions to inequality
In the previous subsection, we saw that inequality varies substantially between dierent income concepts.
Furthermore, we have found dierences in the patters with regard to the data sources because of variations
in the coverage rates and the distributions of specic variables. In this subsection, we discuss the factors
which contribute to inequality in a more systematic manner.
For the variables which are included in the surveys, its impact on the distribution depends on three
factors: First, its distribution in the original micro dataset. Second, the ratio between the sum of that
variable over all individuals in the dataset and the value of the corresponding aggregated variable in
national accounts, i.e. the coverage rate. The inverse of the coverage ratio is the factor by which the
income component is multiplied when we rescale that variable (see section 2). Third, the contribution of
the specic variable to total national income in the national accounts.
Figure 3 Original distributions (SILC, Wave 2014, Equal split)
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Notes: This graph shows the distribution of income components in the raw data. The income groups are dened on the basis of
post-tax national income.
Source: SILC, own calculations and illustration.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the income components in the original micro datasets.12 The
innermost (dark) areas represent the share of the bottom 50% of the population, whereas the outermost
(light) areas account for the share of the top 5%. Gross wages are generally concentrated in the middle
of the income distribution; both the bottom 50% share and the top 5% share are low compared to other
variables. The share of the bottom 50% in gross operating surplus, which mainly consists of actual and
imputed rents, is generally a bit higher than in wages, whereas the top 5% share is quite similar. Mixed
12The income groups are dened on the basis of post-tax national income. The results for pre-tax national income are
highly similar.
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Figure 4 Original distributions (HFCS, Wave 2014, Equal split)
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Notes: This graph shows the distribution of income components in the raw data. The income groups are dened on the basis of
post-tax national income.
Source: HFCS, own calculations and illustration.
income and property income, on the other hand, are much more concentrated at the top of the income
distribution.
Pensions, unemployment benets, and other monetary transfers, in contrast, are more equally distributed.
The share of the bottom 50% of these income components is generally high, whereas that of the top 5%
is rather negligible. The distribution of social contributions is usually similar to that of wages, whereas
taxes on both employment and capital income are more unequally distributed. The tax on the latter is
primarily paid by the upper part of the income distribution, the former by the middle. The patterns
quantitatively dier somewhat between SILC and HFCS but are qualitatively similar.
The impact of the income components on the distribution changes considerably when we rescale them
to national accounts aggregates, because each variable is distributed dierently across the population.
Figure 5 shows how well the survey data cover the dierent income components compared to national
accounts. Gross wages and salaries are generally well captured, the coverage rate for SILC data ranges
between 90 and 105%. Some countries match their survey data for wages and salaries with administrative
data, so that the coverage rate is close to 100%. Gross wages in the HFCS are usually a bit lower, but
the coverage rate is still respectable for many countries. The rescaling factor for wages is consequently
low for both surveys.
Gross operating surplus, as a ratio of national accounts totals, in general varies a lot across countries. In
many cases, the SILC, which reports imputed rents in the data, covers almost 100% of national aggregates.
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In some countries, however, coverage is not very good. For the HFCS, we impute rents based on data on
homeownership and the capital market approach (see section 2). The deviation between SILC and HFCS
can thus be considerable due to these dierences in the data sources and the methodology.
The coverage rates of mixed and capital income are generally much lower and vary considerably between
countries. With the very exception of the latter in France, their rescaling factors are usually quite large.
There is also substantial variation in the coverage rates for pensions, unemployment benets and other
monetary transfers across countries. They are however much higher than for capital income, in particular
for pensions for which they amount to almost 100% in some cases. Taxes on employment and social
contributions are in general also well covered, given by the fact that they are simulated by EUROMOD
and that wages are the primary source for employment income.
Figure 5 Coverage rates (Wave 2014)
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Notes: This graph shows the coverage of income components in comparison to the aggregates of the national accounts.
Source: SNA, SILC, HFCS, own calculations and illustration.
Figure 6 summarizes the impact of the variables on the distribution of post-tax national income.13 Nat-
urally, those income components which are unequally distributed in the survey data, whose coverage rate
is low (so they consequently have a high rescaling factor) and/or their contribution to national income is
high, have the highest impact on the distribution.
Interestingly, gross wages have mixed eects on the distribution of post-tax national income. In some
countries, they reduce inequality when added and in others they increase it. Wages are generally con-
centrated in the middle, so that their impact depends on how the other variables are distributed.14 In
the case of already highly unequal income distribution, the addition of wages is likely to entail a decrease
13The impact of the variables on the distribution of pre-tax national income is highly similar.
14This is obviously true for all variables. However, wages stand out in that the sign of their eect varies, not just the size.
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in inequality, and vice versa. Furthermore, wages make up a large part of national income, so that their
impact (in whatever direction) is higher than for other income components. A similar albeit less marked
ambiguous eect can be observed for the operating surplus, and, in some countries, for pensions.
Mixed income and property income on the other hand increase inequality of post-tax national income in
all countries. Both are very unequally distributed and have low coverage in the surveys, so that their
rescaling factors are high. Even though mixed income is less than 25% and property income less than
10% of national income, their impact on the distribution is substantial.15
Figure 6 Contribution to Inequality of post-tax national income (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2014, Equal
split)
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Besides the variables discussed above, which directly come from survey data, the imputed variables also
have a substantial impact on the distribution. Their eect on the one hand depends on the original
distribution of the income component which we use as the basis for their imputation, and on the other
hand on its contribution to national income. The highest unequal eect has the primary income of
nancial and non-nancial corporations, due to the fact that they are distributed similarly to property
income. Since their relative size in national income is comparable, these two variables have a similar
impact on the distribution. Social transfers in kind and collective consumption in contrast have the
highest redistributive eects. Both amount to around 10 to 20% of national income and are distributed
equally across the population.
The contributions of the dierent methodological steps to the income distribution are summarized in Fig-
ures 7 and 8. Naturally, the scaling eects are particularly high for the top 5% of the income distribution,
15See Table A.2 in Appendix A for the contributions of all variables to national income.
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because property income and mixed income, which are concentrated at the top, are usually not covered
well by surveys. In some countries, the income of the top 5% is more than doubled by re-aligning micro
data to national accounts. In Finland, France, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain, where the coverage
rates of both capital income and mixed income are rather high, in particular of the SILC, the eect of
rescaling is in contrast rather low. For the HFCS, which generally covers these income components less
well, the scaling eect on the income of the top 5% is high even for those countries.
The imputations at the level of the household sector increase the income of the bottom 50% relatively
more than those of the other income groups. These variables include social transfers in kind, which we
distribute equally, so that low income groups generally benet more from them. In Belgium and the
Netherlands however the imputations at the level of the household sector also increase the income of the
top 5% substantially. This is due to the inclusion of other capital income, which primarily consists of
private pensions and are concentrated at the top of the distribution.
The imputations at the level of the total economy generally benet the bottom and the top of the
distribution most. On the one hand, these variables include collective consumption, which has similar
eects as social transfers in kind. On the other, these imputations also include the primary income of
nancial and non-nancial corporations, which we distribute similarly to capital income, and which thus
mostly accrues to the top 5%. The eect of the latter is particularly high where the primary income of
corporations contributes a substantial amount to national income, such as in the Netherlands.
Figure 7 Eects of scaling and imputations (SILC, Wave 2014, Equal split)
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national level are summarized in Table 1.
Source: SNA, SILC, own calculations and illustration.
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Figure 8 Eects of scaling and imputations (HFCS, Wave 2014, Equal split)
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Notes: The income of each group is normalized to 100 %. The variables which are rescaled and imputed on the household and
national level are summarized in Table 1.
Source: SNA, HFCS, own calculations and illustration.
4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to construct Distributional National Accounts (DINA) from household survey
data (SILC, HFCS). We build on the insights of both the DINA and the EG-DNA literature to develop
a transparent and easily reproducible methodology, which can be used to construct DINA whenever
administrative tax data are not available, and apply this methodology to various European countries.
By doing so, we build synthetic micro datasets which cover the entire distribution, include all income
components separately, and are consistent with national accounts. These datasets are highly comparable
across countries.
We nd that realigning the primary income of the household sector to national accounts totals and
imputing the primary income of the other institutional sectors increase inequality signicantly in most
countries. Our ndings thus generally conrm the need to construct DINA to get a more adequate picture
of the income distribution. The distributional eects of these methodological steps however vary between
countries and data sources. These dierences can primarily be attributed to variations in the coverage
rate of mixed and capital income as well as in their distributions in the original micro dataset. Dierences
in the importance of the variables for national income in national accounts also play a non-negligible role.
Furthermore, we nd that income inequality declines substantially when we move from pre-tax factor
income to post-tax national income due to the redistributive eects of the tax system, the welfare state,
and collective consumption, with the rst one usually not being very progressive in most countries. Our
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ndings are similar for the two periods for which we build DINA. Not surprisingly, using the individual
split instead of an equal split in general increases inequality. This is all very well in line with the DINA
literature.
Comparing the DINA approach to that of the EG-DNA, we nd that post-tax disposable income and
disposable income of the household sector show considerable dierences in distribution in most countries.
Including the primary income of the corporate sector and the state usually increases inequality signi-
cantly. Interestingly, the distribution of adjusted disposable income is similar to that of post-tax national
income in many countries. Apparently, the distributive eects of including the primary income of the
other sectors and collective consumption partly neutralize each other.
In general, the impact of a variable in the income distribution depends on its own distribution in the
original survey data, the coverage rate, and the contribution of the variable to national income. Mixed
income and capital income as well as the primary income of the corporate sector usually have the largest
unequal eect. The rst two are highly unequally distributed already in the micro data and generally
have a low coverage rate. The last one is distributed similarly to capital income and amounts considerably
to national income in most countries.
Social transfers in kind and collective consumption in contrast have the highest redistributive eects. Both
contribute a signicant amount to national income and are distributed equally by means of a per-capita
allocation across the population. Wages, pensions, unemployment benets and other monetary transfers
usually reduce inequality, albeit in some cases only slightly. In some countries, wages even increase the
Gini coecient for post-tax national income because they are concentrated in the middle of the income
distribution. Our methodological steps benet income groups dierently: The top 5% of the income
distribution prot most from the rescaling eect. The imputation of variables, which include the primary
income of the corporate sector as well as social transfers in kind and collective consumption, usually
increases the incomes at the top and the bottom most.
All the three above-mentioned factors which aect inequality vary considerably across countries, data
sources and time, which leads to variations in the income distributions. Our methodology (as well as other
approaches in the DINA literature which use survey data) must therefore be applied with some caution,
in particular when constructing time series of distributional indicators such as the Gini coecient or the
Top 5% share. The patterns in inequality which we nd in the dierent income denitions however are
highly similar for the two periods for which we construct DINA and in general resemble each other for the
dierent data sources, which hints at a certain consistency in the data and conrm the robustness of our
methodology. Even though there could be variations in the levels of inequality over time due to variations
in the data sources, our methodology is generally well suited to construct synthetic micro datasets for
policy analysis, given the fact that the impact of, say, a tax reform only needs DINA for a specic year.
Our datasets are thus a major improvement over traditional distributional analyses, which ususally use
the original survey data.
Comparing our results to those in the literature however reveals that our methodolgy is still likely to
underestimate the income inequality due to the absence of tax data. In the case of France, where the
coverage of mixed and capital income in the surveys is nearly 100%, our results for the Gini coecient and
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the top 5% income share are signicantly lower than those of Garbinti et al. (2018).This shows that surveys,
even if they cover these forms of income well, still underrepresent the income concentration at the top of
the distribution, given that they only include a sample of the population. For many countries however,
increasing the quality of data on mixed and capital income by matching surveys with administrative data,
would most probably improve our results. Furthermore, note that it is generally not straightforward to
compare our results to those based on more aggregated approaches, given that the latter usually realign
total income to national accounts.16 All the above-mentioned three factors which aect inequality in our
methodology can contribute considerably to dierences in the results, given that we realign and impute
each variable separately to national account totals.17 Nevertheless, the decline in inequality from pre-tax
to post-tax national income in our approach is similar to that in the literature for most countries.
16The results in the WID database for most European countries are based on Blanchet et al. (2019), who use such an
aggregated approach. See section 1.
17To some extent, the deviation of our results from WID data for post-tax national income is due to the fact that we
choose to distribute collective consumption equally between individuals. See section 2.
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A Additional Tables
Table A.1 HFCS reference periods
Wave 1: Income Wave 2: Income
AT 2009 2013
BE 2009 2013
DE 2009 2013
EL 2009 2014
ES 2007 2010
FI 2009 2013
FR 2009 2014
IT 2010 2014
NL 2009 2013
PT 2009 2012
SI 2009 2013
SK 2010 2013
Source: HFCS.
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Table A.3 Taxes
Code Tax
Austria
Employment income D51A C01 Income tax
D51A C03 Tax on industry and trade
D51A C04 Contribution to chambers
D51A C05 Contribution to chambers
D51A C08 Wage tax
Property income (sim.) D51A C06 Tax on capital yields
D51A C07 Tax on interest
Property income (other) D51A C02 EU withholding tax on interest income of non-residents
Belgium
Employment income D51A C02 Business' advance tax payment (PP)
D51A C03 Advance payments (PP)
D51A C04 Assessments (PP)
D51A C06 Special social contributions
D51A C07 Contribution large incomes
D51A C09 Other taxes on income
Property income (sim.) D51A C01 Advance tax payment on movable property (PP)
Property income (other) D51A C05 Annual tax on prot sharing
D51A C08 Tax on the worker's particip. in the benet/capital of the comp.
Germany
Employment income D51M C01 Tax on wages
D51M C02 Income tax
Property income (sim.) D51M C03 Capital gains tax and interest income deduction
D51M C04 Trade tax
Greece
Employment income D51A C01 Income taxes on individuals
D51A C03 Taxes on Pension (AGAGE)
Property income (sim.) D51A C02 Taxes on interest and other taxes on individuals
Italy
Employment income D51A C01 Personal income tax
D51A C02 Regional income-tax surcharge
D51A C03 Municipal income-tax surcharge
D51A C08 Contributions to GESCAL - employees' contribution
Property income (sim.) D51A C04 Withholding tax on income from deposits paid by households
D51A C10 Withholding tax on company dividends paid by households
Property income (other) D51A C05 Local income tax paid by households
D51A C06 Substitutive tax on nancial instruments and assets
D51A C07 10% Surcharge on income
D51A C14 Substitute tax on income from rental property
D51A C09 Municipal capital gains tax on buildings paid by households
D51A C11 Municipal tax on industry, crafts and professions
D51A C12 Tax on life insurance and supplementary pension schemes
D51A C13 Tax on actuarial reserve
Netherlands
Employment income D51A C01 Wage tax
D51A C02 Income tax
Property income (other) D51A C03 Dividend tax (households)
Notes: For countries not mentioned in the table, we use the value of the simulated property income taxes from EUROMOD and
realign it with the scaling factor of property income. The dierence of the sum of property taxes calculated in this manner and D51 in
national accounts is then used as the macro aggregate for taxes on employment income.
Source: Own illustration.
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B Additional Results for Wave 2014: Individual split
Figure B.1 Inequality for income concepts: Gini coecient (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2014, Individual
split)
Italy Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece
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Figure B.2 Inequality for income concepts: Top 5% share (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2014, Individual
split)
Italy Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece
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Figure B.3 Original distributions (SILC, Wave 2014, Individual split)
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Figure B.4 Original distributions (HFCS, Wave 2014, Individual split)
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Figure B.5 Contributions to Inequality (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2014, Individual split)
HFCS SILC
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Figure B.6 Eects of scaling and imputations (SILC, Wave 2014, Individual split)
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Figure B.7 Eects of scaling and imputations (HFCS, Wave 2014, Individual split)
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C Additional Results for Wave 2010
C.1 Equal split
Figure C.1 Inequality for income concepts: Gini coecient (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2010, Equal split)
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Figure C.2 Inequality for income concepts: Top 5% share (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2010, Equal split)
Italy Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece
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Figure C.3 Original distributions (SILC, Wave 2010, Equal split)
Gross wages
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Gross operating surplus
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Gr. mixed income
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Property income rec.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Pensions
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Unemployment benef.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Other monetary transfers
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Interest paid
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Taxes on capital income
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Tax on employm. inc.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Employee soc. contr.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Employer social contributions
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
P1−50
P51−95
P96−100
Figure C.4 Original distributions (HFCS, Wave 2010, Equal split)
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Figure C.5 Coverage rates (Wave 2010)
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Figure C.6 Contributions to inequality (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2010, Equal split)
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Figure C.7 Eects of scaling and imputations (HFCS, Wave 2010, Equal split)
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Figure C.8 Eects of scaling and imputations (SILC, Wave 2010, Equal split)
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C.2 Individual Split
Figure C.9 Inequality for income concepts: Gini coecient (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2010, Individual
split)
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Figure C.10 Inequality for income concepts: Top 5% share (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2010, Individual
split)
Italy Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
DII
NC
O
DII
NC
AD
INC
PR
INC
O
PR
INC
PR
TF
I
PR
TN
I
PO
TD
I
PO
TN
I
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
Income Concept
In
co
m
e 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 T
o
p 
5
Approach EG−DNA DINA Data Source HFCS SILC
36
Figure C.11 Original distributions (SILC, Wave 2010, Individual split)
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Figure C.12 Original distributions (HFCS, Wave 2010, Individual split)
Gross wages
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Gross operating surplus
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Gr. mixed income
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Property income rec.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Pensions
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Unemployment benef.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Other monetary transfers
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Interest paid
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Taxes on capital income
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Tax on emplym. inc.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Employee soc. contr.
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
Employer social contributions
0
20
40
60
80
100
AT
SK
SI
PT
NL
IT
FR
FI
ES
EL
DE
BE
P1−50
P51−95
P96−100
37
Figure C.13 Contributions to Inequality (SILC & HFCS, Wave 2010, Individual split)
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Figure C.14 Eects of scaling and imputations (SILC, Wave 2010, Individual split)
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Figure C.15 Eects of scaling and imputations (HFCS, Wave 2010, Individual split)
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D Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile
Figure D.16 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (HFCS, Wave 2010, Equal Split)
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Figure D.17 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (HFCS, Wave 2014, Equal Split)
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Figure D.18 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (SILC, Wave 2010, Equal Split)
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Figure D.19 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (SILC, Wave 2014, Equal Split)
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Figure D.20 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (HFCS, Wave 2010, Individual Split)
Italy Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
Original data Scaling effects Imputations HH lev. Imputations DINA lev.
Figure D.21 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (HFCS, Wave 2014, Individual Split)
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Figure D.22 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (SILC, Wave 2010, Individual Split)
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Figure D.23 Components of POTNI by Income Vingtile (SILC, Wave 2014, Individual Split)
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